How to Negotiate With Putin

As details emerge of the March 18 phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, a classic Kremlin tactic is unfolding before the world’s eyes: Create a problem, and demand a price to solve it.

In this case, the solution is a 30-day moratorium on attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. The quid pro quo is that Ukraine should cease its retaliation against Russia’s energy infrastructure—or be accused of standing in the way of peace.

And, of course, there is the expected sting in the tail, from the Kremlin: a demand that Ukraine should not mobilize or rearm.  That amounts to saying: in return for neither side attacking each other’s energy infrastructure, and before a full cease-fire is agreed, Ukraine will be denied the means to defend itself from Russia’s continuing aggression.

Since the chances of Russia fully respecting a cease-fire are effectively nil, and there is no prospect of Putin’s fundamental aims changing, that is a deal no one should buy.

Putin’s responses will have surprised no one who has dealt with his regime. His earlier response to Trump’s proposal of a temporary 30-day cease-fire was that any agreement would need to address the “underlying causes” of the conflict. It is worth understanding in more detail what Putin sees as the underlying causes since this offers a guide to what a negotiation with Putin is about and how to conduct it.

First and foremost, according to Putin, the conflict is about his belief that Ukraine is not a country but an “anti-Russian project” of the West. This, in turn, is about Putin’s idea of Russia itself: an imperial Great Power, of which Ukraine is a part. In his view, Ukraine must be prevented from becoming a Western-leaning democracy, which speaks to Putin’s fear of internal challenge.

Second, the conflict is about calling a halt to NATO enlargement. This is not based on a well-founded fear that NATO will one day attack Russia or even that Ukraine will join NATO. It is about correcting a consequence of the end of the Cold War: the freedom of nations in Central and Eastern Europe to choose their own destinies—to make a reality of the “indivisibility of security” of which Russian officials themselves like to talk. They do not mean that all countries have a right to security. They mean that Russia has a veto over other countries’ security arrangements, while others have no such veto over Russia.

Third, there is another, overarching factor: geopolitical rivalry with the United States, and resentment of Russia’s diminished standing after the Cold War. Many of Putin’s statements at key turning points have been about this and not directly about Ukraine. His diatribe at the 2007 Munich Security Conference was against U.S. unilateralism.

In 2018, during Trump’s first presidency, his anger was directed at the U.S. withdrawal 16 years earlier from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the prospect of growing U.S. strategic advantage. In 2021, just before the invasion of Ukraine, Putin demanded that NATO should withdraw forces to where they stood in 1997, and that Washington should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe.

So, what is at stake in a negotiation in 2025?

The key negotiations are between the United States and Russia; the United States and Ukraine; and within the NATO alliance over how to support Ukraine and how to assure its own security.

Both Trump and Putin prefer bilateral deal making over the heads of lesser powers.

There is no evidence that any of Putin’s goals have changed. He wants to declare victory in his “special military operation”; to decouple the United States from Europe; to assert hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe; to reclaim Russia’s Great Power status; to remove sanctions; to regain legitimacy; and to cut the United States down to size.

It is not entirely clear what Trump wants to achieve. To burnish his credentials as a deal maker? To end a conflict in Europe? To transfer costs and risks to the Europeans? To normalize relations with Russia? To peel Russia and China apart?

The central idea of Trump’s approach is that Ukraine should trade land for peace. On its own, this is a dangerous illusion: Surrendering Ukrainian land won’t buy peace, any more than “dividing up” assets—as Trump put it—will. Without security guarantees, it will simply buy time for Russia to rearm. Agreeing to Russian demands to disarm Ukraine or withhold the means to defend itself will ensure future Russian aggression.

Security guarantees between Ukraine and its allies are the heart of the matter. There is no prospect of Russia changing its fundamental aims; no prospect of Russia agreeing to meaningful Western security guarantees for Ukraine; and no basis for trusting any undertakings from Moscow.

Ukraine’s security therefore relies on deterring Russia, not cooperating with it; so does Europe’s security. The choice is whether to deter further Russian aggression, at high cost and risk, or deal with the consequences of failing to do so, at much higher cost and risk.

That leaves some big questions for NATO—about whether Trump sees Europe’s security as inseparable from that of the United States. It is now also about trust. In any scenario, the U.K., Europe, and Canada will need to develop their own defense capabilities, including autonomous capabilities that are not reliant on the United States.

Putin’s response to Trump’s proposed cease-fire demonstrates that Putin thinks he’s negotiating from a position of strength. Putin is almost certainly counting on Trump’s impatience for a deal—and his impatience with both Ukraine and his NATO allies—working to Russia’s advantage.

Putin’s position has been greatly strengthened by two grave mistakes by Trump. The first is the heavy pressure the United States has applied to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky without putting corresponding pressure on Putin. The second is Trump’s willingness to take steps toward normalization of U.S. relations with Russia, without requiring Putin to address the causes of the breakdown in relations.

This is exactly what Putin wants: to demonstrate that Russia’s interests must be taken into account and that Russia cannot be isolated. Trump’s approach to negotiating with Putin is an open invitation to Putin to put forward maximalist demands and wait for others to meet them.

Putin has already obtained major concessions up front and at no cost—in particular, statements by the Trump administration taking NATO membership and restoration of Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders off the table, and questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy.

This is reminiscent of Trump’s agreement with the Taliban during his first administration, which gave the Taliban the biggest prize of all—the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan—with no binding obligation on the Taliban to do anything in exchange. The military withdrawal that Trump’s 2020 Doha Accord set in motion led to the collapse of the Afghan government and the chaotic evacuation of Kabul in August 2021, during Joe Biden’s presidency.

It is not hard to work out what would put Russia under real pressure and increase the chances of a lasting cease-fire. It requires creating conditions in which Russia’s position inevitably weakens over time: strengthening Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself; increasing economic pressure on Russia (bearing down on Russian oil sales receipts and tightening sanctions implementation, for example); and a concerted NATO response to the threat Russia presents to its security.

Russia will only contemplate a genuine cease-fire if all the alternatives are worse—and will worsen further over time.

Even if the United States does not want to be engaged in an assurance force for Ukraine, it should avoid actions that split the alliance. It is bizarre to demand that other NATO members step up while at the same time launching trade wars, culture wars, and making claims on allies’ territory.

The big lesson of both the Cold War and the growing confrontation with Putin is that a coherent alliance approach is key to successful management of the threat. Internal divisions play to Russia’s strengths even when Putin’s position is inherently weak.

Ukraine’s allies need to refrain from doing Putin’s work for him.

Don’t let the Kremlin control the timing or substance of negotiations.

Don’t let the Kremlin change the subject, set its own agenda, or create false equivalence.

Don’t agree to measures that have the purpose of destabilizing Ukraine.

Do plan for what happens after a cease-fire: Russia will certainly seek to undermine Ukraine’s stability, decouple it from its allies, and evade any obligations Russia has taken on.

Don’t let ambition to do deals with a strongman damage the alliances that are democracies’ greatest asset in containing threats to our interests.

Don’t fall prey to the illusion that Putin dislikes, fears, and resents U.S. power any less because Trump is in the White House. There is no prospect of peeling Russia off from China.

Finally, do plan for how to keep the peace: a difficult, expensive, long-term effort, mostly by Europe but with U.S. engagement, that will need to be sustained for as long as an angry, bitter, malevolent Russian leadership is waiting for its chance to redraw the post-Cold War settlement in Europe.